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ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to contextualize the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) and 
enrich our understanding of it by submitting constructivist insights to its policy 
assessment   with   a   focus   on   the   Employment   Strategy   (EES).   The   most 
developed and longest-standing OMC policy area, employment provides fertile 
ground for the assessment of a rapidly expanding theoretical perspective in IR 
and   European   integration   applied   to   a   growing   policy   process.   Normative 
considerations as to the essence of the EU and its future trajectory were highly 
influential in the process of launching the OMC. 
The paper provides a framework of integration theory and highlights the particular 
contribution that the ‘thin’ variant of constructivism has made in understanding 
different aspects of EU policy and politics. In the next section, the OMC is 
discussed and its core characteristics identified. I claim that most of the OMC’s 
core elements are directly linked to constructivist assumptions about policy 
change. The paper identifies three of those, namely policy discourse, learning 
and participation in policy-making. I subject those to an empirical and theoretical 
assessment by use of the relevant literature. Concluding that the record shows 
such mechanisms to be hardly present in the Employment Policy OMC, I argue 
that an institutionalist reading of OMC provides a credible alternative by focusing 
on power resources, preferences and strategies available to core OMC actors, 
namely member states and the Commission. The paper concludes with a twofold 
argument: firstly, constructivist hopes on OMC are, at least in the current context, 
ill-founded. Secondly, while the OMC retains a number of advantages, practical 
policy suggestions that will enhance its appeal to policy-makers and the public 
alike are due before it becomes a credible policy option. 
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1Introduction
During the 1990s, the theoretical debate on European integration was transformed. The 
previous   duopoly   accorded   to   IR-based   approaches   and   comparativist   readings   saw   a 
newcomer enter the fray. Governance approaches, multi-level or otherwise, now occupy hefty 
academic space and proclaim the need to understand the EU in terms that go beyond both a 
standard international organization and the projection of domestic politics in the supranational 
arena (Pollack 2005). In some respects, the growth of this governance perspective has been 
inevitable. Ever since the process of integration gathered pace in the 1980s, the Union has 
extended its policy reach into fields that were previously under the exclusive jurisdiction of 
member states. At the same time and in recognition of the issues of legitimacy that this 
expansion of competences would bring about, the EU has sought to bolster its credentials 
through   institutional   reform   to   appease   an   increasingly   skeptical   public   as   to   the 
appropriateness of its decision-making structures (Eberlein and Kerwer, 2004: 122). 
The competence levels of member states, supranational institutions and a whole variety of 
regulatory authorities and agencies that span a large spectrum of policy issues makes clear 
delineation of authority much more complicated than in the past, and raises new issues as to 
the exact nature of the European ‘beast’. Imperfect as the governance approach may be, it 
accurately captures the complexity of policy-making in the EU as well as the hybrid nature of a 
large number of its institutional arrangements. Implicitly or explicitly, a large body of governance 
advocates suggests that contemporary socio-economic and political constellations require the 
adoption of flexible policies by the EU as the overriding framework of its legitimacy as well as 
the augmentation of its effectiveness in policy-making. 
It is in the context set by the above considerations that the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) 
acquires particular significance. Most frequently perceived as the prototype example of new 
governance methods, the OMC is meant to combine the best of all possible worlds. Its open-
ended nature assuages intergovernmentalist fears as to the nature of the European project 
while its emphasis on cognitive processes of learning and iterative communication allows for 
potential improvements in policy effectiveness. What is more, its inclusive nature can be seen 
as an answer to ‘input legitimacy’ issues (Scharpf 1999).
This paper seeks to contextualize the OMC and enrich our understanding of it by submitting 
constructivist insights to a policy assessment of OMC with a focus on the Employment Strategy 
(EES) and its policy impact. The most developed and longest-standing OMC policy area, 
employment provides fertile ground for the assessment of a rapidly expanding theoretical 
2perspective in IR and European integration applied to a growing policy process. Normative 
considerations as to the essence of the EU and its future trajectory were highly influential in the 
process of launching the OMC (Radulova, 2007: 8). 
The paper begins by placing the discussion in context. It provides an overall framework of 
integration   theory   and   highlights   the   particular   contribution   that   the   ‘thin’   variant   of 
constructivism has made in understanding different aspects of EU policy and politics. In the next 
section, the OMC is discussed and its core characteristics identified. I claim that most of the 
OMC’s core elements are directly linked to constructivist assumptions about policy change. The 
paper thus proceeds by explicitly identifying three of those, namely policy discourse, learning 
and participation in policy-making. I subject those to an empirical and theoretical assessment by 
use of the relevant literature. Concluding that the record shows such mechanisms to be hardly 
present in the Employment Policy OMC, I argue that an institutionalist reading of OMC provides 
a credible alternative by focusing on power resources, preferences and strategies available to 
core OMC actors, namely member states and the Commission. The paper concludes with a 
twofold argument: firstly, constructivist hopes on OMC are, at least in the current context, ill-
founded. Secondly, while the OMC retains a number of advantages, practical policy suggestions 
that will enhance its appeal to policy-makers and the public alike are due before it becomes a 
credible policy option. 
Integration Theory in Context
European integration theory originates in the period prior to the formation of the European 
Community. Derived mainly from IR, it served a didactic function in that it sought to identify the 
conditions allowing for the peaceful co-existence of states and the reduction of inter-state 
animosity. David Mitrany (1943) and his functionalist thesis sought to derive optimistic lessons 
from the existence of transnational organizations linked up in a network-like fashion. These 
would play a decisive role in averting state aggression. 
Functionalism   proved   normatively   useful   in   preparing   the   ground   for   its   successor, 
neofunctionalism. The latter, along with its great intergovernmenatlist rival, sought to explain the 
process   of   European   unification   as   experienced   after   the   Rome   Treaty.   For   some 
neofunctionalists integration could be ascribed to processes of enhanced communication 
facilitating   mutual   understanding   across   borders   (Deutsch   1957).   For   others,   the   liberal 
institutionalist distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics served an instructive function in that it 
pointed to the potential mechanisms through which shared interests in some policy areas could 
3then spill over into others, magnifying the scope and pace of integration (Haas 1970). 
Neofunctionalists were also mindful of the need to go beyond the normative prescriptions of 
functionalism   and   integrated   into   their   approach   an   account   of   institutional   salience 
concentrated in organs such as the Commission (see Diez and Wiener, 2004: 8). 
By the late 1990s, neofunctionalism was making a comeback in the integration debate. In its 
refined version, the neofunctionalist argument claimed that the surrender of sovereignty to 
suparanational authorities is the result of increasing pressure for uniform rules across the Union 
following high cross-border transaction volumes. Eventually, governments will accede to the 
demands  of domestic groups; as supranational authorities  get on with the task of rule 
enforcement they contribute to the generation of new demands for further suparanational 
activity and centralization in the decision-making process (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997; 
Fligstein and Stone Sweet 2002). Seen in this light, neofunctionalism does not only suffer from 
the difficulties of explaining policy outcomes as developed since the latest round of EU crisis hit 
EU capitals, that is, its distance from empirical reality. It also appears reliant on a mechanistic 
reading of integration that can hardly account for processes such as the OMC, as the latter has 
not come to rely on uniform rules (Schäfer, 2006: 196). 
Intergovernmentalists benefited from the political and institutional crisis of the 1960s in that they 
centered their argument on the supremacy of rationally defined state interests setting the pace 
of cooperation (Hoffman 1966). Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) conceded some 
ground to neofunctionalists on the salience of supranational actors, but asserted the need to 
emphasize state actors and their preference formation sets. Briefly, Moravcsik argued on the 
basis of a two-step process, whereby the first step relates to the formation of preferences at the 
domestic level and the second draws from bargaining theory. In the first step, member state 
governments articulate ‘national preferences’ towards the EU having synthesized their own 
position and those of powerful domestic groups, whilst in the second stage they reflect these 
preferences at the intergovernmental level. The outcome of the bargaining process at EU level 
is hardly affected by suparanational institutions, which are deemed irrelevant. Moreover, 
bargaining outcomes reflect the relative distribution of power in the Council and can thus hardly 
result in outcomes detrimental to the preferences formed domestically by the larger and more 
influential Member States (Moravcsik 1991; 1993; 1998). 
The dominance of these approaches was challenged in the 1980s. The Single European Act 
and its aftermath signaled that grand theorizing may be ill-suited in explaining the emergence of 
a complex European polity, in which the degree and scope of authority in decision-making was 
increasingly ill-suited to the rather simplistic understanding underpinned by a state-centered 
4logic.
1 Two different strands emerged in this second phase, following each other closely but 
overlapping in terms of empirical application to this day. The first strand was dominated by an 
attempt to explain the nature of the European ‘beast’ and detect the origins and consequences 
of its new mode of functioning. A large part of this theoretical strand sought to apply the tools of 
comparative politics to the study of Europe, seeking to overcome the dominance of US-
stemming IR to the study of integration (Diez and Winer 2004). Chief among the new terms that 
accompanied this strand, and reflective of developments in political science (Rhodes 1996) and 
IR (Keohane 2001) were governance.
Governance has been used to depict different processes that apply to different domains. It is an 
ambiguous term whose validity needs to be verified with respect to the precise object of study. 
In the IR literature, governance emerged with the end of the Cold War. The momentous events 
that accompanied the transition to the post-Cold War international system were distinguished by 
the acceleration of de-nationalization and the loss of sovereign state power over multiple actors 
(Kohler-Koch and Ritterberger, 2006: 30). Governance was in this sense a response to the 
search for enhanced ‘problem-solving’ capacities in an era of complexity. In comparative 
politics, Ron Rhodes has pointed to the need to understand governance as a process distinct 
from government and comprising interrelated networks of service providers of the public and 
private sector (Rhodes 1996). 
In European Union studies, multi-level governance has been a prominent theme in EU studies 
over the last fifteen years. It draws from network theory to the extent it defines EU policy-making 
as the result of interdependence between governments at national and sub-national level on the 
one hand, and the complex interaction of state and non-state actors on the other (Bache and 
Flinders 2004). The multi-level governance literature asserts that a very significant shift of 
authority has occurred, one in which sub-state authorities (especially regions), in combination 
with regulatory agencies and private corporations, undertake increasingly important roles in EU 
policy-making, thus undermining the role and scope of national governments (Hooghe and 
Marks 2001). 
The relationship between different levels of authority has led to the formation of various 
approaches to European integration. One of the most important ones is the ‘new modes of 
governance’ literature. Whereas both IR-derived readings of integration that emphasize the top-
down   character   of   the   EU   and   governance-derived   insights   (such   as   the   burgeoning 
1 State-centred here means that both neofunctionalism and intergovernmntalism have as an implict or explicit point of 
departure the role of member states in explaining policy outcomes. State-centrism in the IR sense of the term is 
hardly applicable to Moravcsik’s style of intergovernmentalism, as his first-level process of preference formation not 
only accepts the importance of domestic groups in a state’s policy position but assigns a crucial role to their influence 
before arriving at the national position.
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processes of integration, ‘new governance’ suggests that integration can occur even without the 
force   of   sanctions   enforced   by   formal   legal   proceedings   (López   Santana   2006).   New 
governance can be sub-divided into different categories, but all of its different types share 
common practices that distinguish it from traditional governance as understood in the Rhodes 
definition. First, new governance has a coordinating function of bringing together various levels 
of government to accomplish common goals. Secondly, it has a deliberative function where the 
goals themselves are subject to negotiation and reflection by a high number of invited 
stakeholders. Finally, it leaves ample space for informal practices as it tends to rely on cognitive 
agreements as opposed to the officially sanctioned way forward that older types of governance 
prefer. This discussion will be picked up in greater detail below when analyzing the OMC.
Interacting with governance-based accounts but also building on the work of scholars such as 
Moravcsik is what can be generally termed the institutionalist approach. New institutionalism 
was  based on the assumption that ‘institutions  matter’ to explain policy outcomes. The 
shortcomings of a behavioralist approach met with criticism that led to the rise of ‘new 
institutionalism’, a ‘general banner under which all…concerns with institutional features have 
been   elaborated’   (Shepsle,   1989:   135).   Rational   choice,   sociological   and   historical 
institutionalism all agree on the salience of institutions in structuring expectations of behavior 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996: 955). In its EU colors, institutionalist work of both historical and rational 
choice perspectives has revealed some of the shortcomings inherent in LI. From a historical 
institutionalist perspective, Pierson (1996) developed the concept of ‘unintended consequences’ 
to show how member states can lose control of integration. Certain policies can become ‘locked 
in’ in a way that reshapes the logic of integration and takes agenda-setting powers away from 
member  states. At  the same time, rational  choice institutionalists  have challenged   both 
neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist approaches, asserting the salience of EU institutions 
while critical of neofunctionalists’ ‘lack of microfoundations’ (Pollack, 2001: 228).   Scharpf 
(1988) applied rational choice to the study of European integration as early as the late 1980s 
through the ‘joint decision trap’ argument. Later studies looked at the role of suparanational 
institutions, such as the ECJ (Garrett 1992) and the Parliament (Tsebelis 1996). The role of EU 
institutions can under certain conditions (for instance when preference formation is unclear) 
become crucial in policy outcomes (Pollack 2003).
Before turning to the constructivist school, it is important to refer to Europeanization as a new, 
exciting sub-theory of research largely accompanied by the turn to governance. Europeanization 
has often been understood as the change or reform of national institutions, policies or indeed 
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‘goodness of fit’ argument (Cowles et al. 2003), which argues that the ease of national policy 
adjustment to changes introduced from above (the EU level) will hinge on the extent to which 
national political, economic, administrative and legal structures are compatible with the EU 
pattern   adopted.   Such   ‘top-down’   approaches   have   been   complemented   by   ‘bottom-up’ 
readings of Europeanization that tend to see a reciprocal relationship in that member-states 
themselves can on occasion ‘upload’ their own set of preferences/policy styles to the EU level. 
In a definition that captures the essence of its multidimensional character, Radaelli sees it as 
consisting   of   processes   of   construction,   diffusion   and   institutionalization.   These   include 
paradigms, beliefs and ‘ways of doing things’ that have been first defined at EU level and 
subsequently absorbed by governments and regions on the level of public discourse and policy 
(Radaelli, 2004: 3). Radaelli’s references to discourse and policy paradigms is instructive as to 
the influence that the constructivist argument has made, inter alia, in trying to understand the 
process of integration in the contemporary European Union. In fact, it would hardly be an 
exaggeration to state that normative understandings of the European Union have come to 
occupy a large part of the contemporary debate on integration. 
The second strand of European integration theory that emerged by the late 1990s and 
continues to grow in terms of academic influence is the constructivist school. Because of its 
salience in OMC processes
2, the remainder of this paper will discuss the various strands of 
constructivism and relate them to OMC, before assessing potential lessons for integration 
theory more generally. 
The Constructivist School and OMC
The   emergence   of   constructivism   was   part   of   European   studies   ‘catching   up’   with   the 
corresponding IR literature, and the surfacing of critical, feminist and other meso-theoretical 
approaches after the end of the Cold War. Distinct from both previous strands, constructivists 
have sought to argue not on the basis of the institutional foundations of the European polity but 
about its social construction (Christiansen et al. 2001). In particular, the focus of attention here 
lies less with the problem-solving capacities of the EU, but the normative and social principles 
that have given shape to particular dimensions of the Euro-polity. The salience of constructivism 
2 Falling under the rubric of ‘new governance’, OMC is not meant to ‘fit’ particular theoretical approaches better than 
others. The examination of OMC that follows will hopefully illustrate that a lot of constructivist work provides the 
undertone for the spread of OMC in ever more policy fields.
7has been pronounced so large that it has become, along with rational choice approaches, the 
second major academic pole of attraction in IR scholarship (see Katzenstein et al. 1998). 
Normative considerations have made a major contribution to the EU debate insofar as they 
have highlighted the importance of legitimacy in contemporary policy-making. This debate 
began   in   earnest   after   the   adoption   of   the   Maastricht   Treaty   and   continues   unabated. 
Constructivist readings tend to differentiate themselves from institutionalist accounts in that they 
emphasize the subjective nature of preference formation resulting from the complex pattern of 
interaction that agents are subjected to. This is in sharp contrast to the fundamental premises of 
methodological   individualism   prevalent   in   rational   choice   analyses   (Risse,   2004:   160). 
Institutions for constructivists are not merely sets of rules and expectations that structure 
expectations   of   rational   actors.   Institutions   are   constitutive   of   actors,   their   beliefs,   their 
preferences and their interests (Checkel 1998). 
This element of constructivist thinking shares a lot of common ground with sociological 
institutionalism. Institutions and culture are somehow blurred as the former also includes norms, 
symbols, and moral templates (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 947). The danger of socio-economic 
determinism is acknowledged and the limitations of human rationality recognized. Actors are not 
deemed capable of retaining complete rationality in all their actions. Instead, this cultural 
interpretation of the role of institutions adopts the ‘logic of appropriateness’ to explain individual 
behavior. Institutions are here deemed to be of utmost importance as they not only determine 
the preferences of actors but also contribute significantly to the shaping of these preferences. 
They provide people with a cognitive chart through which they construct their identities and thus 
decide on a course of action. In a given situation, the argument goes, the individual both 
responds and recognizes the environment around him or her based on the templates offered to 
him/her through the institutional world. 
From a constructivist point of view, membership in the EU is not simply a process of institutional 
and ‘hard’ political consequences, but constitutes a new social reality that affects member 
states’ identification and enhances their socialization (Checkel 2000). Communication and 
mechanism   matter   greatly   to   constructivists.
3  By   employing  argumentative   rationality, 
constructivists assert that the relative power relations of policy actors and strategically-guided 
behavior recede to the background. Instead, agents interact based on an open-ended script with 
3 Like all broad schools of thought, constructivism entails different strands of thought. The more radical versions of 
this school reject the possibility of objectivity in social sciences  and are question the importance of all 
epistemological enquiries and validity of quantitative or qualitative research methods. Though important in their 
own right, the nihilistic assumptions prevalent within this faction are not the focus of the present study. Moreover, 
there are increasing signs that ‘moderate’ constructivists are willing to engage in a fruitful intelelctual dialogue with 
their institutionalist counterparts .
8no pre-determined outcomes, and maintain a flexible approach to the outcome of interaction. 
This is not to be confused with the absence of goals: the latter exist, but are shaped and 
reshaped through an attempt to reach a consensual point and build on that, rather than make 
sure that the original set of preferences withheld by agents becomes the norm. This approach is 
very relevant to EU studies in general and the OMC in particular. Constructivists have 
highlighted   the   deliberative/argumentative   quality   inherent   in   EU   proceedings.   Through 
argumentative rationality preferences and strategies by actors become subject to an iterated 
process of persuasion and become unstuck from nationally pre-defined calculus sets. Portraying 
the EU as a large forum of deliberation and persuasion through communication thus becomes 
possible (Risse, 2004: 165). The OMC will be seen below to operate largely under the 
framework of deliberation as understood by constructivist scholars.
The OMC based on soft law is almost universally identified with new governance methods. Its 
spread into a vast array of policy fields and the central role attributed to it by the Commission 
and the Council makes it a particularly exciting field of research. In what follows, I provide a brief 
description of the process and its background, before evaluating its legitimacy and effectiveness 
against the background of integration theory. An assessment of OMC prospects and its 
consequences for integration follows.
OMC and EES: new and innovative?
In a way similar to governance, soft law has been used in the IR literature as part of an attempt 
to identify the constraints and opportunities inherent in international law. While Realist-based 
approaches see nothing more than a façade in the use of legal proceedings in the international 
system, institutionalist accounts recognize benefits in the use of soft law and identify it with the 
pattern of decision-making that emerges once a deviation from standard, hard law procedures 
emerges. The benefits of a soft law framework are multiple. It helps reduce costs, leads to a 
decline of uncertainty and offers flexibility and speed. Furthermore, it is inclusive in the sense 
that it permits the incorporation of all relevant actors in policy-making, and can potentially 
provide the first significant step towards the adoption of hard law instruments (Trubek et al. 
2005). In the European Union sense of the term, the classic definition of soft law is the one 
offered by Snyder, who understood it to mean ‘rules of conduct which in principle have no 
legally binding force but which nevertheless may have practical effects ‘ (Snyder cited in Trubek 
et al. 2005: 1). The OMC is in many ways the archetypal policy process that uses soft law 
instruments to achieve policy objectives.
9As a term, the Open Method originates from the Lisbon Summit of 2000 and the goal set there 
to make the Union the world’s most dynamic, knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010 
‘capable of sustainable growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ (Lisbon 
European   Council   point   5,   23-24   March   2000, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm ). To achieve this, the Union sought to rely 
on a soft method of policy coordination respectful of member state sensitivities on socio-
economic policy prerogatives but also mindful of the impossibility of the task in the absence of 
greater coordination. Even before the Lisbon Summit, however, the Open Method had been 
practiced in the economic and employment field and had become identified with the European 
Employment Strategy (EES) adopted in 1997. What is important is to stress that the adoption of 
OMC was accompanied by an acceptance of the principle that binding legal rules may not be 
the best way forward any longer. The Classic Community Method (CCM) in particular, reliant as 
it is on harmonization through hard law instruments, was in conflict with the unwillingness by 
member states to devolve decision-making on employment to the Union. 
The OMC comprises a core number of characteristics that apply to all policy domains in which it 
is practiced. First, general goals and objectives are defined at member state level, occasionally 
accompanied by guidelines. Member states are expected to follow policies leading to the 
fulfillment of the set objectives. Second, member states need to respond to those objectives 
through Action Plans, Reform Programmes and the like showing how the general can be made 
particular. Third, the evaluation process of OMC entails peer review, in which member states 
are supposed to learn from each other, share beneficial experiences and reinforce the cycle 
through a continuous search for higher standards and the readjustment of objectives in light of 
new evidence (Zeitlin and Trubek 2003). 
A few key remarks on OMC are in order. First, it would be mistaken to talk of one OMC. OMC 
processes are now followed in as many as 13 policy fields (Szyszczak, 2006: 494). Secondly, its 
proliferation has led to its differentiated application depending on the policy field examined, and 
the operationalization of very different instruments beyond the core identified above. For 
instance, guidelines vary from being very concrete (employment) to very general (social 
inclusion). The European Parliament is generally not an actor in OMC processes, with some 
exceptions (employment). Finally, while some OMCs identify indicators that are meant to guide 
policy practice quite explicitly (again employment), in other domains hardly any indicators exist 
at all (pensions) (Heidenreich and Bischoff, 2008: 508). A final important point is that the 
principles behind the OMC are not unique to the European Union. The OECD and the IMF have 
10also practiced aspects of ‘multilateral surveillance’ (Schäfer 2006). The innovative character of 
the process can thus be doubted.
The European Employment Strategy
4  took shape in the mid-1990s in the context of high 
unemployment and rising pressures on social expenditure budgets. It was elaborated at the 
1997 Amsterdam Summit as to the content of an Employment Strategy. An Employment 
Committee was set up to draft Guidelines and monitor progress.  Every member state draws up 
a NAP explaining how it intends to implement these Guidelines. The Council, the Commission 
and the Member States scrutinize the success of the strategy, while the Commission and the 
Labour and Social Affairs Council synthesize the National Reports and assess both nation-
specific   and   EU-wide   performance.   This   results   in   a   Joint   Employment   Report   by   the 
Commission and the Council, alongside the Commission’s own Annual Report on employment 
performance. Employment Guidelines have been revised annually and extended in scope. After 
the 2001 Stockholm Summit, the EES has also encompassed horizontal objectives on achieving 
full employment, promoting quality of work and lifelong learning, further incorporating the social 
partners in the process and targeting particular employment rates for different occupational 
categories. Major changes to the Guidelines were implemented in 2003; following a radical 
reform in 2005, they are now presented in conjunction with macroeconomic and microeconomic 
policy guidelines for a three-year period. The so-called ‘Integrated Guidelines for Jobs and 
Growth’ form the basis for the successors of the NAPs, the National Reform Programmes. 
Constructivism and OMC I: Discourse 
Discourse plays a central role in the implementation of OMC. Considering that soft law practices 
are based on non-coercion to achieve policy objectives, the communicative and persuasive 
functions that result from discursive practices come to occupy centre ground in fulfilling the 
policy objectives set out by policy actors.
In that respect, constructivism’s emphasis on discourse as a framework of operation that has 
the potential of fundamentally altering actors’ preferences and beliefs makes it crucial in 
understanding OMC. Vivien Schmidt’s discursive institutionalism is an analytical framework 
based on constructivist insights, offering the chance of assessing constructivism in relation to 
OMC. For Schmidt (2002), policy discourse should be understood through its procedural and 
ideational dimensions (Schmidt 2002:10), which serve linked but distinct purposes. In the 
ideational sphere, discourse aims at the legitimization of particular policies through an appeal to 
4 The description and assessment of the EES is based on Tsarouhas, 2008: 348-350.
11long-standing values, norms and ideas (Paster, 2005: 154). Hence, the ideational dimension 
entails an element of persuasion through cognitive functions and a normative agenda on the 
appropriateness of choosing particular course of action. On the other hand, the procedural 
dimension entails communicating the chosen discourse to the public and coordinating a certain 
policy programme by coming to agreement as to its overall objectives.
Clearly, the OMC on employment entails a strong discursive element. Based on the analytical 
categorizations   made   by   Schmidt,   current   empirical   evidence   points   to   meager   results. 
Ideationally, the EES is not a contributor to, but a reflection of, the 1990s consensus on the 
alleged   need   to   prioritize   supply-side   employment   measures   to   boost   European 
competitiveness. The Employment Strategy was successful in bringing together disparate ideas 
on the appropriateness of a new type of employment policy, as it combined a Third Way 
disciplinary approach to employment with the Scandinavian focus on active labour market 
policies. There is some evidence to suggest that in some member states the discursive 
operations of the social partners have changed as a result (Tsarouhas 2008). Procedurally, the 
OMC on employment has had very little practical effects on the discourse followed by Member-
States. Discursive coordination has taken place only to the extent that generalities about the 
desirability of ‘more good quality jobs’ became a policy mantra espoused by social democrats 
and   conservatives   alike   in   non-integrated,   nationally-defined,   segregated   terms   of 
communication. Also, empirical evidence points to the limited knowledge (and interest) of the 
European public to the process, surely a function of negligible media interest in the process (see 
de la Porte and Nanz, 2004: 278-279). 
Constructivism and OMC II: Policy Learning
Constructivism   assigns   primary   importance   to   policy   learning   insofar   as   it   rejects   fixed 
preference formation and asserts that actors are open to the process of learning from others. 
The OMC on Employment is certainly built around this principle – in fact it could be argued that 
its raison d’ etre is to utilize policy learning in order to overcome the disadvantages related to 
the absence of hard law convergence. In the words of the Council, OMC is expected to lead to a 
culture of ‘strategic management and of learning from experience…’ (Council of the European 
Union, 2000: 7). Policy learning has been observed in some cases WİTH REGARD TO THE 
Employment Committee, albeit in conditions that do not jeopardize ‘vital’ national positions 
(Jacobsson and Vifell 2003). Political elites have imitated aspects of learning in that they have 
sought to bring to popular attention the successes of other member states in boosting 
12employment rates. However, this aspect of a constructivist reading of OMC is also filled with 
problems. Firstly, constructivist readings suggest that paradigmatic rather than procedural 
change is what can be achieved through OMC and the evidence for that is very thin. Secondly, 
whether policy change introduced in some member states can be directly attributed to OMC 
rather than more endogenous factors remains uncertain. Thirdly, policy learning has been 
shown  to be more likely  in  those areas of employment  policy  where an overwhelming 
consensus has been established as to their desirability (ibid). Substantive policy learning that 
translates into a systemic shift in central parameters of policy formulation has yet to emerge as 
a result of OMC.
Constructivism and OMC III: Participation
A final variable of immediate importance for the OMC is the constructivist emphasis on 
deliberation and participation by a wide community of policy actors that interact on the basis of 
relative equality. The Union has underlined that it conceived of the OMC as a forum ideal for 
stakeholder participation involving NGOs, social partners and civil society more generally. This 
feature has been identified as one of the clear advantages (Radaelli 2003), adding to its aura of 
innovation and relevance to the needs of modern complex polities. In fact, the same line of 
argument has allowed for the articulation of a bigger argument stressing the need to overcome 
old hierarchical patterns of accountability and instead promote ‘direct deliberative polyarchy’ 
(DDP) (see Sable and Zeitlin 2007; Büchs 2008). This is a type of participatory politics that 
refreshes democracy in that it rejects the unfashionable parliamentary modes of accountability 
and encourages a stakeholder model of input legitimacy.
5  Peer review in OMC is clearly 
relevant here, as it is meant to function as a form of horizontal accountability mechanism and at 
the same time illustrate how in a multi-actor setting based on participatory principles, there are 
no fixed external preferences and ‘ideal’ policy solutions are discussed and researched.
Once again, however, available data is hardly consistent with the theoretical picture painted 
above. The participatory nature of OMC has hardly been proven in practice. De la Porte and 
Pochet (2005) have argued that social partners remain outside the OMC structures and their 
participation levels in the policy-making process have hardly been affected by it. Tsakatika 
(2007)   has   found   that   national   parliaments   are   also   excluded.   Though   this   is   more 
understandable considering the DDP-related ambitions of aspects of the OMC, the reported 
increase in some stakeholders’ activities (especially NGOs, Zeitlin 2005) remains uneven and 
5 On legtimacy, see the rationalist/institutionalist section below.
13varied to an extent that undermines coherence in an argument supportive of higher levels of 
participation. If the ability of the Open Method to induce policy change is to go through consent-
based widening of the relevant policy circle is to occur, the current record leaves little room for 
optimism. 
A Rationalist/Institutionalist Explanation of OMC
If constructivist arguments on the salience of OMC are weak, the  conceptualization  and 
implementation of the open method in the field of employment can be better understood by 
employing a rationalist account. In what follows, I will argue that a Moravcsik-type reading of the 
OMC comes close to reflecting the formation of preferences by member states at the domestic 
level   prior   to   its   execution.   However,   it   is   necessary   to   combine   this   insight   with   an 
institutionalist account that treats the Commission as a serious policy actor involved in both the 
conceptualization and implementation phases. Also, ideational factors have not been entirely 
irrelevant to the OMC in employment – though they have strengthened the role of powerful 
domestic groups in that they boosted the prevalence of a supply-side orientation in labour 
market policy.
To start with conceptualization, the OMC was in effect inaugurated in 1997. Throughout the 
Union, ‘structural economic reform’ had become a policy mantra that united (most) social 
democrats, liberals and conservatives. The understanding of structural reform was premised on 
the core theme of replacing ‘old-fashioned’, sticky and inflexible modes of employment policy-
making (most prominently with regard to employment protection) with policies emphasizing the 
employability of the workforce and the need for a constant upgrading of skills to fit the narrower 
labor market straightjacket that cut for Europe’s workforce in the 1990s. The Third Way was an 
embodiment of this attitude and it is little coincidence that the main themes of the EES borrowed 
heavily from the policies and proposals floating around the ‘New’ Labour Party at the time. What 
is important to emphasize here is that the conceptualization stage in the domestic national 
arena was far from neutral with regard to its consequences. An attempt has been made to brush 
over   the   essentially   political   nature   of   the   EES   that   relates   to   a   strategy   of   labour 
commodification (Hyman 2005), but its essential characteristics have not been disguised very 
successfully. Domestic coalition groups that have long argued in favor of radical reform towards 
a supply-side, welfare-to-work orientation were by that time structurally advantaged over 
alternative proposals or ideas (Ashiagbor 2005). Disagreement as to the content of EES policy 
is not what explains the emergence of soft law in EES; just the contrary. While on the one hand 
14the EU has promoted negative integration trough the articulation of policies and policy initiatives 
that paved the way for market liberalization and deregulation, it has failed to counter-balance 
those processes with positive integration aiming at market-correcting initiatives (Scharpf, 2006: 
854). The author’s diagnosis for this asymmetry has given shape to an argument whereby 
institutional barriers (the heterogeneous nature of preferences in an enlarged Union and high 
QMV requirements) render the political dimension inherent in positive integration a prohibitive 
task.
Whilst supply-side reformers have therefore had the upper hand in formulating the policy 
agenda with which member states could argue the case for EES, this in itself is inadequate in 
explaining the convergence of preferences towards the particular strategy adopted. What need 
to be added to this account are the particular type of policy harmonization chosen, soft law and 
non-coercion, as well as the role of the European Commission in that process.
To start with, soft law and learning-induced policy harmonization was and remains a risk-free 
strategy for national governments. Sure enough, some of the criticism exerted against soft law 
integration methods is beside the point. The argument that hard law sanctioning does not take 
place in OMC is tautological, since OMC was created precisely because it was made clear that 
hard law harmonization in those policy fields was not forthcoming. Also, a rigid separation 
between the two types is probably unnecessary, as there are complementarities between the 
two forms that allow for their fruitful co-existence (Trubek and Trubek 2005). Still, this does not 
alter the fact that soft law provides a win-win framework for governments to work in. Should 
policy results improve, governments can (and do) reap the electoral and political benefits. 
Should there be no tangible results, they can shift the blame to ‘Brussels’ and seek to explain 
meager results on account of vague ‘policy disagreements’. Furthermore, the absence of 
sanctioning mechanisms makes compliance with potentially identified ‘best practice’ a policy 
option to be considered in combination with domestic political priorities, ideological preferences 
and so on. It is not, and cannot be, a path to be followed with no alternatives open for 
consideration. Rather, the functioning of OMC can become enmeshed in the domestic political 
game through the politicization of targets, standards or indicators (Benz, 2007: 519). Apart from 
making the discerning of OMC effects even more difficult, such a process reduces the potential 
for policy learning as originally envisaged by the OMC creators.
Secondly, the conceptualization of the EES needs to consider the role of the Commission. Far 
from being an irrelevant actor, the Commission was from the outset the other major policy 
player, next to the Council, in managing the OMC and employment policy in particular. The 
historical and institutional context of its operation acquires added significance here. First, the 
15timing of the EES inception coincides with the decline of the Commission as an agenda-setter in 
EU politics. The Delors era, characterized by the Commission’s interventionist instincts and the 
upgrade of its institutional profile, was accompanied by a decline in its power and influence. 
What is more, member states sought to downplay its importance and attempted to claim back 
part of its agenda-setting role. Recognizing the impossibility of hard law harmonization in the 
field of employment, the Commission assented to OMC in recognition of the fact that its policy 
role would be enhanced as a result. In addition, the EES and OMC more generally was (and 
possibly remains) an avenue that the Commission wishes to explore so as to boost its reduced 
credibility and legitimacy credentials (Büchs 2008). Scharpf (1999) has argued that legitimacy 
and effectiveness can be captured by ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy processes. ‘Input legitimacy’ 
refers to the degree of inclusiveness and participation that EU decision-making processes 
permit for the various stakeholders involved. The Open Method sought to combine both in an 
attempt to bridge the gap between, inter alia, Europe with the public (European Commission 
2001: 3). 
While a convergence of preferences explanation does well to account for the emergence of a 
consensus on the EES, institutionalist readings are essential to understand the role of the 
Commission. This is all the more apparent when one looks at the relaunching of the OMC (as 
well as the EES) after Lisbon’s mid-point in 2005. The assumption of overall coordination 
functions   by   the   Commission   and   the   attempt   to   streamline   procedures   relates   to   the 
Commission’s insecurity as to its future role. By 2005, it had become clear that member states 
were unwilling to delegate authority on employment and social issues. To retain resources, the 
Commission was willing to accept the disadvantageous trade-off of procedural for substantial 
influence in the OMC. The implementation of the EES, to the extent that it is representative of 
the OMC, shows that a rationalist/institutionalist reading accounts better than construcivist 
approaches for this type of attempted integration. 
Conclusion: The limits of Constructivism and OMC suggestions
High expectations were occasionally cultivated as to the effectiveness of the OMC. Though not 
all, a large number of analysts invested those expectations in constructivist mechanism of policy 
change based on discourse, deliberation and learning. De la Porte and Nanz (2004) argued that 
the legitimacy basis of the EU could be strengthened through the implementation of the open 
method, while Zeitlin (2005) argued in favor of the OMC on account of its potential to enact 
16policy   change   through   communicative   interaction   (information   exchange)   and   systematic 
comparisons. 
Empirical evidence points to negligible effects along those lines with regard to the OMC’s most 
developed policy network, employment. Radulova (2007) has shown that deliberation and policy 
learning are largely absent from the (powerful) Employment Committee. In line with rationalist 
models, the Employment Committee has functioned more along the lines of a bargaining forum 
whereby the preferences adopted by policy actors were hardly subject to modification through 
deliberative interaction (Radulova, 2007: 376). Moreover and following the relevant review of the 
literature, Büchs points out that the OMC has failed to live up to its alleged potential with regard 
to the Union’s social dimension in reducing socio-economic disparities and boosting the life 
chances of its citizens (Büchs, 2008: 770). 
This paper has argued that the Open Method relies to a disproportionate extent on constructivist 
understandings of policy change. Though its remit does not include passing judgment on the 
possibility of this occurring in other settings, policy change in the EU context under the influence 
of the OMC has not occurred – and is very unlikely to occur at any point in the future. Discourse, 
policy learning and participation retain their theoretical and empirical value in contexts where the 
engagement of policy actors is less informed by strategic calculations and where the issue of 
sovereignty as a guiding principle in the formulation of formal policy positions has acquired less 
salience than it currently does on matters of employment policy.
The current economic crisis has had a visible effect on employment. At the beginning of 2009, 
the unemployment rate in the Eurozone area was 8.2%. The latest monitoring report on the 
employment situation across the Union reveals that the effects of the crisis will become more 
visible over 2009 and unemployment will increase further (European Commission 2009). In a 
context of falling GDP rates, massive layoffs are feared throughout Europe and have led to 
nationwide strikes (France, Italy, Slovenia, and Greece). The fear of unemployment now 
dominates the policy agenda. The divergence in employment policy performance that had been 
observed prior to the crisis persists. While Holland has an unemployment rate of 2.7%, the 
Spanish equivalent has reached 14.5% and is projected to climb much higher by the end of 
2010.
What the above suggests is that the Open Method has failed to live up to a constructivist-
inspired potential. Steps taken to reform its functions can, however, prove useful
6 provided that 
a more rationalist/institutionalist understanding of its purpose and effectiveness dominates such 
reform. Two such proposals are proposed here. First, the OMC can and should become 
6 For a sample of proposals aiming at boosting the OMC see Metz (2005).
17internally flexible by setting differentiated quantitative goals for different member-states. Current 
employment and unemployment level discrepancies should be approached realistically and 
short-, medium- and long –term quantitative goals be set for each member state. This could 
over time lead to convergence of policy outcomes. Secondly, the effectiveness of OMC could be 
boosted through the use of EU financial carrots in compliance with OMC employment policy 
goals. This proposal, which has been made in a different form before, would entail intra-Union 
redistribution of funds with an emphasis to Central and East European states that perform 
particularly well on the employment OMC, and potentially the social exclusion OMC as well. The 
logic behind financial rewards is to pragmatically address the current gap in social provisions 
dividing old from new member states and try to make the notion of ‘Social Europe’ a unifying 
feature of the Community rather than a divisive policy item centered on its implications for 
economic competitiveness. Such proposals could enhance the one aspect of the Open Method 
that is truly crucial to its legitimacy: its policy effectiveness. Amidst the current economic gloom, 
actions speak louder than words.
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